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Abstract. Distributed-password public-key cryptography (DPwPKC) allows the members of a group of
people, each one holding a small secret password only, to help a leader to perform the private operation,
associated to a public-key cryptosystem. Abdalla et al. recently defined this tool [1], with a practical
construction. Unfortunately, the latter applied to the ElGamal decryption only, and relied on the DDH
assumption, excluding any recent pairing-based cryptosystems. In this paper, we extend their techniques to
support, and exploit, pairing-based properties: we take advantage of pairing-friendly groups to obtain effi-
cient (simulation-sound) zero-knowledge proofs, whose security relies on the Decisional Linear assumption.
As a consequence, we provide efficient protocols, secure in the standard model, for ElGamal decryption
as in [1], but also for Linear decryption, as well as extraction of several identity-based cryptosystems [6,
4]. Furthermore, we strenghten their security model by suppressing the useless testPwd queries in the
functionality.
1 Introduction
Recently, Abdalla et al. [1] proposed the notion of distributed-password public-key cryptography
(DPwPKC), which allows the members of a group of people, each one holding a small independent
secret password, to act collectively (for the benefit of one of them, who “owns” the group) as the cus-
todian of a private key in some ordinary public-key cryptosystem — without relying on any secure
(secret and/or authentic) storage — as long as each member remembers his or her password. Precisely,
in DPwPKC, the members initially create a “virtual” key pair (sk, pk), by engaging in some distributed
protocol over adversarial channels, where only pk is revealed, while sk is implicitly determined by the
collection of passwords. Third parties can perform the public-key operation(s) of the underlying system
using pk. Members can help the leader of the group perform private-key operation(s) in a distributed
manner, by engaging in some protocol using only their knowledge of their respective passwords.
Password-based public-key cryptography is generally considered infeasible because password-based
secret-key spaces are easy to enumerate, and the knowledge of the public key makes it possible to
test the correct key from that space, without interacting with anyone (offline dictionary attack). In
DPwPKC, there are as many passwords as participants, and (unlike in virtually all applications of
passwords) the passwords are not meant to be shared: they are chosen independently by each player.
Since the passwords need not be related, they will likely be diverse, and the min-entropy of their
combination ought to grow linearly with the number of participants, even if every single password is
itself minuscule. For instance, with ten players each holding a random 20-bit password, the virtual
secret key will be a random 200-bit string, which is more than enough to build a secure public-key
system for usual values of the security parameter. This is what makes sk in DPwPKC resistant to
brute-force off-line dictionary attacks, even though the corresponding pk is public.
The main contribution of [1] was to define general functionalities for distributed password-based
key generation and private computation in the UC model, and to give a construction for ElGamal
decryption as a proof of concept. However, the construction proposed in [1] was merely illustrative
because it required generic simulation-sound non-interactive zero-knowledge (SSNIZK) proofs for NP
languages, which can only be performed efficiently in the random oracle model [3]. Furthermore, their
distributed private computation protocol could only perform the task of computing csk from the im-
plicit secret key sk, and the security of their protocol relied on the DDH assumption. Together, these
restrictions limited its applicability to ElGamal decryption.
c© Springer-Verlag, 2010.
In this work, we first improve and strengthen the ideal functionalities defined in [1], by further
restricting the information that the adversary can gain from an attack. This will make any protocol
that we can prove to realize those functionalities stronger, since the simulation will have to work
without this information. (Recall that in the UC model, the functionalities are supposed to capture
everything that we allow the adversary (and thus the simulator) to learn.)
Then, we extend the techniques from [1] to support a much broader class of private-key operations
in discrete-log-hard groups, including operations involving random ephemerals and/or operations in
bilinear groups. More precisely, our construction still targets the distributed computation of csk, but
under the Decision Linear assumption, which makes the proof more intricate since the DDH is now
verifiable: we had to change the workings of the protocol to introduce secret values. Furthermore,
the construction works for several values of c at once, and now allows to share random ephemerals
in the exponent. It thus allows a much greater variety of public-key cryptosystems to be converted
to distributed password-based cryptosystems, including extraction of identity-based private keys —
thus giving us the new interesting notion of “password-based distributed identity-based encryption”
(DPwIBE). Contrarily to regular IBE, the “central” key extraction authority is now distributed among
a group of people (sufficiently many of them trusted), with the “master key” being implicitly contained
in the collections of short independent passwords held by those users.
In the process of strengthening and generalizing the protocols, we also make them much more
efficient. To do so, we develop special-purpose simulation-sound non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
(SSNIZK) for our languages of interest, in the standard model, and show how to use them instead of the
inefficient general SSNIZK considered in [1]. We do this using bilinear maps, in the CRS model, relying
on a classic decisional hardness assumption for bilinear groups. The SSNIZK proofs we construct revisit
the techniques of [12] and use efficient proofs inspired by the recent Groth-(Ostrovsky)-Sahai sequence
of efficient NIZK construction in bilinear groups [14], but do not trivially follow from them.
In summary, we revisit the recent and intriguing notion of DPwPKC, which we strengthen and
extend in several directions. Our general results are, more precisely: 1) to propose new, simpler and
stronger versions of the DPwPKC functionalities defined in [1] by getting rid of the testPwd query;
2) to show how we can realize the general functionalities much more efficiently, without random oracles,
by constructing new SSNIZK proof techniques from bilinear pairings, inspired from the NIZK proof
system proposed by Groth and Sahai [14] under the Decisional Linear assumption [5]; 3) to show how to
apply our protocol to implement a very broad class of public-key cryptosystems from discrete-log-type
hardness assumptions in bilinear groups; and 4) in particular, to show how to apply our technique to
transform the pairing-based Boneh-Franklin [6] and Boneh-Boyen [4] identity-based cryptosystems (and
most of the latter’s many extensions), to realize the notion of distributed password-based identity-based
encryption (DPwIBE). In DPwIBE, contrarily to regular IBE, the “central” key extraction authority
is now distributed among a group of people (sufficiently many of them trusted), with the “master key”
being implicitly contained in the collections of short independent passwords held by those users.
In order to do all this, and in particular to get the efficient pairing-based approach working, a
number of new technical challenges had to be solved. We specifically mention the following: 1) the use
of pairings not only helps us make efficient zero-knowledge proofs for various languages, it would also
help the adversary verify the result of the private computation csk in the basic DPwPKC protocol from
[1]. Since the UC model requires that the simulation be carried out until the end on both correct and
incorrect inputs, this will make our new security reduction somewhat more intricate since the result
sent at the end of the simulation is random and we do not want the adversary to become aware of it.
2) In connection with the stronger and simpler functionality definitions we propose, the adversary is no
longer allowed to conduct explicit password compatibility tests prior to the private-key operation. This
should intuitively further complicate the simulation, though we remarkably note that these queries were
indeed useless in the proofs and thus getting rid of them has no negative impact. 3) Generally speaking,
we achieved much of our security and efficiency gains over [1], by succeeding to make our protocols
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being fully robust by the use of public verifications (computations of pairings) rather than intermediate
validity tests (SSNIZK proofs, relying on the random oracle model in [1]). This is generally both more
efficient (no more SSNIZK proofs) and more secure than testing, but it can lead to significantly more
complex simulations owing to the ideal functionality being less “helpful”.
2 Security Model
Split Functionalities. Throughout this paper, we assume basic familiarity with the universal com-
posability framework [8]. See Appendix A for a short introduction of some UC notions we shall use
in this work. Without any strong authentication mechanisms, the adversary can always partition the
players into disjoint subgroups and execute independent sessions of the protocol with each subgroup,
playing the role of the other players. Such an attack is unavoidable since players cannot distinguish
the case in which they interact with each other from the case where they interact with the adversary.
The authors of [2] addressed this issue by proposing a new model based on split functionalities which
guarantees that this attack is the only one available to the adversary.
The split functionality is a generic construction based upon an ideal functionality: Its description
can be found in Figure 5. In the initialization stage, the adversary A adaptively chooses disjoint subsets
of the honest parties (with a unique session identifier that is fixed for the duration of the protocol).
During the computation, each subset H activates a separate instance of the functionality F . All these
functionality instances are independent: The executions of the protocol for each subset H can only be
related in the way A chooses the inputs of the players it controls. The parties Pi ∈ H provide their
own inputs and receive their own outputs, whereas A plays the role of all the parties Pj /∈ H.
Note that the use of these split functionalities already allows the adversary to try some passwords
for users by choosing subgroups of size 1 and trying a password for each of them while impersonating
the other players. They are thus enough to model on-line dictionary attacks. In [1], additional TestPwd
queries were available to the adversary, thus allowing additional password trials. In this paper, we limit
the adversary against the ideal functionality (i.e. the simulator), to the unavoidable on-line dictionary
attack but in the strict sense, and thus without any additional TestPwd queries. This means that we
give less power to the simulator. Both the constructions in [1] and ours do not need them in the security
proofs, which means that a stronger security level is reached.
In the sequel, as we describe our two general functionalities FpwDistPublicKeyGen and FpwDistPrivateComp
(the complete descriptions can be found in Figures 3 and 4), one has to keep in mind that an at-
tacker controlling the communication channels can always choose to view them as the split func-
tionalities sFpwDistPublicKeyGen and sFpwDistPrivateComp, which implicitly consist of multiple instances of
FpwDistPublicKeyGen and FpwDistPrivateComp for non-overlapping subsets of the original players. Further-
more, one cannot prevent A from keeping some flows, which will never arrive. This is modelled in our
functionalities by a bit b, which specifies whether the flow is really sent or not.
The Players and the Group Leader. We denote by n the number of users involved in a given
execution of the protocol. All the computation is done for the benefit of only one of them, denoted as
the group leader. The role of all the other ones, the players, is to help it in its use of the group’s virtual
key. A group is thus formed arbitrarily and is defined by its composition, which cannot be changed: a
leader, which is the only one to receive the result of a private computation in the end, and a (ordered
or not, according to the secret key computation from the passwords) set of players to assist it.
The Aim of the Functionalities. The functionalities are intended to capture distributed-password
protocols for (the key-generation and private-key operation of) an arbitrary public-key primitive, but
taking into consideration the unavoidable on-line dictionary attacks. More precisely, the aim of the
distributed key generation functionality FpwDistPublicKeyGen (Figure 3, page 17) is to provide a public
key to the users, computed according to their passwords with respect to a function PublicKeyGen given
as parameter. Moreover, it ensures that the group leader never receives an incorrect key in the end,
whatever the adversary does.
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In the distributed private computation functionality FpwDistPrivateComp (Figure 4, page 18), the aim
is to perform a private computation for the sole benefit of the group leader, which is responsible for
the correctness of the computation; in addition, it is the only user to receive the end result. This
functionality will thus compute a function of some supplied input in, depending on a set of passwords
that must define a secret key corresponding to a given public key. More precisely, it will be able to check
the compatibility of the passwords with the public key thanks to a verification function PublicKeyVer,
and if it is correct it will then compute the secret key sk from the passwords with the help of a
function SecretKeyGen, and from there evaluate PrivateComp(sk, in) and give the result to the leader.
The function PrivateComp could be the decryption function Dec of a public-key encryption scheme, or
the signing function Sign in a signature scheme, or the identity-based key extraction function Extract
in an IBE system.
Note that SecretKeyGen and PublicKeyVer are naturally related to the function PublicKeyGen called
by the former functionality. In all generality, unless SecretKeyGen and PublicKeyGen are both assumed
to be deterministic, we need the predicate PublicKeyVer in order to verify that a public key is “cor-
rect” without necessarily being “equal” (to some canonical public key). Also note that the function
SecretKeyGen is not assumed to be injective, lest it unduly restrict the number of users and the total
size of their passwords. The distributed computations should not reveal more information than the
non-distributed ones, and thus the ideal functionalities can make use of these functions as black-boxes.
The Functionalities. We only recall here the main points of the functionalities, referring the
interested reader to [1] for details. But, importantly, as in [9], the functionalities are not in charge
of providing the passwords to the participants. The passwords are chosen by the environment which
then hands them to the parties as inputs. This guarantees security even in the case where an honest
user executes the protocol with an incorrect password: This models, for instance, the case where a
user mistypes its password. It also implies that the security is preserved for all password distributions
(not necessarily the uniform one) and in all situations where related passwords are used in different
protocols.
The private-computation functionality fails directly at the end of the initialization phase if the
users do not share the same (public) inputs. In principle, after the initialization stage (the NewSession
queries) is over, the eligible users are ready to receive the result. However the functionality waits for the
adversary S to send a compute message before proceeding. This allows S to decide the exact moment
when the result should be sent to the users and, in particular, it allows S to choose the exact moment
when corruptions should occur (for instance S may decide to corrupt some party Pi before the result
is sent but after Pi decided to participate to a given session of the protocol; see [15]). Also, although in
the key generation functionality all users are normally eligible to receive the public key, in the private
computation functionality it is important that only the group leader receives the output (though he
may choose to reveal it afterwards to others, outside of the protocol, depending on the application). In
both cases, after the result is computed, S can choose whether the group leader indeed receives it. If
delivery is denied (b = 0), then nobody gets it, and it is as if it was never computed. Otherwise, in the
first functionality, the other players may be allowed to receive it too, according to a schedule chosen
by S.
Note that given the public key, if the adversary knows/controls sufficiently many passwords so
that the combined entropy of the remaining passwords is low enough, he will be able to recover these
remaining passwords by brute force attack. This is unavoidable and has nothing to do with the fact
that the system is distributed: off-line attacks are always possible in principle in public-key systems,
and become feasible as soon as a sufficient portion of the private key is known.
3 Notations and Building Blocks
The authors of [1] propose a protocol that deals with a particular case of unauthenticated distributed
private computation [2], as captured by their functionalities recalled in the former section. Informally,
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assuming s to be a secret key, the aim of the protocol is to compute a value cs given an element c of
the group. They claim that this computation can be used to perform distributed BLS signatures [7],
ElGamal decryptions [11], linear decryptions [5], and BF or BB1 identity-based key extraction [6, 4]
but they only focus on ElGamal decryptions, relying on the DDH assumption.
Here, we show how to really achieve such results, by constructing a protocol relying on the Decision
Linear assumption [5] for compatibility with bilinear groups. This protocol will easily enable “password-
based” Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme [6]. In the following section, we show how to modify the protocol
to obtain “password-based” Boneh-Boyen (BB1) IBE scheme [4] and linear decryptions [5].
Notations. Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p and g3 a generator of G.
The linear encryption works as follows: The private key is a pair of scalars, sklin = (x1, x2), and the
public key, pklin = (g1, g2, g3), where g1 = g31/x1 , g2 = g31/x2 . In order to encrypt M ∈ G, one chooses
r1, r2
$← Zp, and the ciphertext consists of C = Epklin(M ; r1, r2) = (C1, C2, C3) = (g1r1 , g2r2 ,Mg3r1+r2).
The decryption process consists of M = Dpklin(C) = C3/(C1x1C2x2).
This encryption scheme is secure under the Decisional Linear (DLin) assumption, first presented
in [5] and stated here for completeness: For random x, y, r, s ∈ Z∗p and (g, f = gx, h = gy, f r, hs) ∈ G5,
it is computationally intractable given gd to distinguish between the case where d = r + s or d is
random. More precisely, a triple (f r, hs, gd) is named a linear triple in basis (f, h, g) if d = r + s. We
also consider a one-time signature scheme consisting of the three algorithms (SKG,Sign,Ver).
Passwords, Public Key and Private Key. Each user Pi owns a privately selected password pwi,
to act as the i-th share of the secret key sk (see below). For convenience, we write pwi = pwi,1 . . . pwi,` ∈
{0, . . . , 2` − 1}, i.e., we further divide each password pwi into ` bits pwi,j , where p < 2` (p is the order
of the group G). Notice that although we allow full-size passwords of up to ` bits (the size of p), users
are of course permitted to choose shorter passwords.
The authors of [1] discussed the use of such passwords to combine properly into a private key sk:
the combination should be reproducible, it should allow to recover either of the passwords from the
key and the other passwords, and it should preserve the joint entropy of the set of paswords. They
also discussed possible cancellation or aliasing effects of the passwords. The preferable solution is to
do standard pre-processing using hashing, i.e. that each user independently transforms his or her true
password pw∗i into an effective password pwi by applying a suitable extractor pwi = H(i, pw
∗
i , Zi) where
Zi is any relevant public information. We can then safely take sk =
∑
i pwi and be assured that the
entropy of sk will closely match the joint entropy of the vector (pw∗1, . . . , pw∗n).
The discrete-log-based key pair (sk, pk = gsk) is then defined as follows:
sk = SecretKeyGen(pw1, . . . , pwn)
def=
∑n
i=1 pwi
pk = PublicKeyGen(pw1, . . . , pwn)
def= g
P
pwi
The password/public-key verification function is then
PublicKeyVer(pw1, . . . , pwn, pk)
def=
(
pk ?= g
P
pwi
)
.
In the following, we focus on a specific format for the PrivateComp function, defined by (sk, c) 7→
m = csk. We show how to perform it in a distributed way, and how to use if for decryption processes,
and private key extraction in IBE.
Building Blocks.
Extractable Homomorphic Commitments. As in [1], the first step of our distributed decryption
protocol is for each user to commit to his password (the details are given in the following section). The
commitment needs to be extractable, homomorphic, and compatible with the shape of the public key.
Generally speaking, one needs a commitment Commit(pw, R) that is additively homomorphic on pw
and with certain properties on R. Instead of ElGamal’s scheme [11] used in [1], we focus here on
linear commitments Commitg(pw, r, s) = (U1pwg1r, U2pwg2s, gpwg3r+s), where (U1, U2, U3 = g) is not a
linear triple in basis (g1, g2, g3) in order to provide extractability, or encryptions Encryptg(pw, r, s) =
(g1r, g2s, gpwg3r+s) (here, g1, g2 and g3 are defined as before and g is a generator of G). In both cases, the
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hiding property or the semantic security rely on the DLin assumption. Extractability is possible granted
the private/decryption key (x1, x2), such that g3 = g1x1 = g2x2 , and recalling that the users commit
to bits. Denoting by (c1, c2, c3) the commitment, it is thus enough to check that c3/(c1x1c2x2) = 1 or
(c3/g)/((c1/U1)
x1(c2/U2)
x2) = 1.
Proofs of Membership. For the robustness and soundness of the protocols, we need some
proofs of honest computations. We use witness-indistinguishable and SSNIZK proofs/arguments. The
difficulty consists in designing such simulation-sound proofs without random oracles: they are described
in Section 6. Along these lines, we use the following kinds of non-interactive proofs:
– CDH(g,G, h,H), to prove that (g,G, h,H) lies in the CDH language: there exists a common expo-
nent x such that G = gx and H = hx. Granted pairing-friendly groups, this can be easily done by
simple pairing computations;
– WIProofBit(C), to prove that the commitment or the ciphertext C contains a bit. We will use a WI
proof from [13], which basically proves that either C or C divided by the basis is a linear 3-tuple;
– SSNIZKEqg,c(C1, C2), to prove that the ciphertexts/commitments C1 and C2 contain the same
value, possibly in the different bases g and c, that is, C1 encrypts/commits to ga and C2 en-
crypts/commits to ca, with the same a. We use a SSNIZK argument, following the overall ap-
proach by Groth [12] to obtain simulation soundness, but using the Groth-Sahai proof system [14]
for efficiency (see Section 6 – the proof is omitted, but very similar to [12]).
4 Description of the Protocols
The Distributed Key Generation Protocol. This protocol is described in Figure 1 and realizes
the functionality FpwDistPublicKeyGen. All the users are provided with a password pwi and want to obtain
a public key pk. One of them is the leader of the group, denoted by P1, and the others are P2, . . . , Pn.
The protocol starts with a round of commitments of these passwords. Each user sends a com-
mitment Ci of pwi (divided into ` blocks pw1,1, . . . , pwi,` of length L — here, L = 1): it computes
Ci,j = (C
(1)
i,j , C
(2)
i,j , C
(3)
i,j ) = (U1
pwi,jg1
ri,j , U2
pwi,jg2
si,j , gpwi,jg3
ri,j+si,j ) for j = 1, . . . , ` and random val-
ues ri,j and si,j , and publishes Ci = (Ci,1, . . . , Ci,`), with a set of proofs WIProofBit(Ci,j) that each
commitment indeed commits to an L-bit block. As we see in the proof (see Appendix B), this com-
mitment needs to be extractable so that the simulator is able to recover the passwords used by the
adversary, which is the reason why we segmented all the passwords and make commitments of bits,
along with a WIProofBit that the committed value is actually a bit. Each user also runs the signature
key generation algorithm to obtain a signature key SKi and a verification key VKi. The users will
be split according to the values received in this first flow (i.e. the commitments, the proofs and the
verification keys), as we see in the second flow where they send a signature of all they have received
up to this point. Thus, the protocol cannot continue past this point if some players do not share the
same values as the others (i.e. one of the signatures σi will be rejected later on and at least a user will
abort).
Once this first step is done, the users commit again to their passwords (by encrypting them, for
efficiency reasons), but this time in a single block: C ′i = (C
′
i
(1), C ′i
(2), C ′i
(3)) = (g1ti , g2ui , gpwig3ti+ui)
(with random values ti and ui) and publish it along with a SSNIZK proof that the passwords committed
are the same in the two commitments: SSNIZKEqg,g(Ci, C ′i), Ci roughly being the product of the Ci,j ,
i.e. a commitment of pwi. The new encryptions C ′i will be the ones used in the rest of the protocol. They
need not be segmented (since we will not extract anything from them, but just make computations on
encrypted values), but we ask the users to prove that they are compatible with the former commitments.
Each user Pi computes H = H(C1, . . . ,Cn), and sends a signature of the values that identifies this
execution, under an ephemeral one-time signature key, to avoid malleability and replay from previous
sessions: σi = Sign(H; SKi). This allows the protocol to realize the split functionality by ensuring that
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everybody has received the same values in the first round (more precisely, the players have been split
according to what they received in the first round, so that we can assume that they have all received
the same values). Note that the protocol will fail if the adversary drops or modifies a flow received by
a user, even if everything was correct. This situation is modeled by the bit b of the key delivery queries
in the functionality, for when everything goes well but some of the players do not obtain the result.
The need for an additional extractable commitment Ci of gpwi (and a proof that the password
used is the same, and that everybody received the same value) is a requirement of the UC model, as
in [9]. Indeed, we show later on that S needs to be able to simulate everything without knowing any
passwords: Thus, he recovers the passwords by extracting them from the commitments Ci made by the
adversary in the first round, enabling him to adjust his own values before the subsequent encryptions
C ′i, so that all the passwords are compatible with the public key (if they should be in the situation at
hand).
After these rounds of commitments/encryptions, the players check the signatures and abort if one
of them is not valid. A computation step then allows them to compute the public key. Note that
everything has become publicly verifiable.
Computation starts from the ciphertexts C ′i, and involves two “blinding rings” to raise sequentially
the values
∏
iC
′
i
(3) = g
P
i pwig3
P
i(ti+ui), g1, g2 and g3 to some distributed random exponent α =
∑
i αi.
The players then broadcast g3α(ti+ui) (the values g1 and g2 are only here to check the consistency of the
values ti and ui and avoid cheating), leaving every player able to compute gα
P
i pwi . A final “unblinding”
allows for the recovery of g
P
i pwi = pk. We stress that every user is able to check the validity of this
computation (at each step, it checks the CDH values to ensure that the same exponent was used
each time): A dishonest execution cannot continue without an honest user becoming aware of it (and
aborting). Note however that an honest execution can also be stopped by a user if the adversary
modifies a flow, as reflected by the bit b in the functionality.
The Distributed Private Computation Protocol. This protocol is presented in Figure 2 and
realizes FpwDistPrivateComp. Here, in addition to their passwords, the users are also provided a public
key pk and a group element c ∈ G. For this given c ∈ G, the leader wants to obtain m = csk. A
big difference with the previous protocol is that this result will be private to the leader. But before
computing it, everybody wants to be sure that all the users are honest, or at least that the combination
of the passwords is compatible with the public key.
This verification step is exactly the same as the computation step in the previous protocol. The
protocol starts by verifying that they will be able to perform this computation, and thus that they
indeed know a representation of the secret key into shares. Each user sends a commitment Ci = {Ci,j}j
of its password as before, and the associated set of WIProofBit(Ci,j).
As in the former protocol, once this first step (which enables the users to be split into subgroups
according to what values they have received) is done, the users commit again to their passwords in
the value C ′i, which will be the ones used in the rest of the protocol, and also send a signature which
enables them to check that they share the same public key pk, the same group element c, and have
received the same values in the first round. It thus avoids situations in which a group leader with
an incorrect key obtains a correct private computation result, contrary to the ideal functionality. The
protocol will thus fail if all these values are not the same to everyone, which is the result required by
the functionality.
Next, the users make yet another encryption Ai of their passwords, but this time they do a linear
encryption of pwi in base c instead of in base g (in the above C ′i ciphertext): Ai = Encryptc(pwi, vi, wi) =
(g1vi , g2wi , cpwig3vi+wi). The ciphertexts C ′i will be used to check the possibility of the private compu-
tation (i.e. that the passwords are consistent with the public key pk = gsk), whereas the ciphertexts
Ai will be used to actually compute the expected result csk, hence the two different bases g and c
in C ′i and Ai, respectively. All the users send these last two ciphertexts to everybody, along with a
SSNIZK argument that the same password was used each time: Π2i = SSNIZKEqg,c(C
′
i, Ai).
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{
(1a) ri,j , si,j
R← Z∗p
Ci,j=Commitg(pwi,j , ri,j , si,j)=(U1
pwi,jg1
ri,j , U2
pwi,jg2
si,j , gpwi,jg3
ri,j+si,j )
Π0i,j = WIProofBit(Ci,j)
(SKi,VKi)← SKG
Ci={Ci,j}j ,{Π0i,j}j ,VKi−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
C
om
m
it
m
en
t
S
ec
on
d
S
te
p
z
}|
{
(1b) H = H(C1, . . . ,Cn,VK1, . . . ,VKn) ti, ui R← Z∗p
C′i = Encryptg(pwi, ti, ui) = (g1
ti , g2
ui , gpwig3
ti+ui)
Ci =
„Q“
Ci,j
(1)
”2j
,
Q“
Ci,j
(2)
”2j
,
Q“
Ci,j
(3)
”2j«
Π1i = SSNIZKEqg,g(Ci, C
′
i) σi = Sign(H;SKi)
C′i,Π
1
i ,σi−−−−−−→
B
li
n
d
in
g
R
in
g
z
}|
{ (1c) abort if one of the signatures σi is invalid
γ
(0)
0 =
Q
i C
′
i
(3)
= g
P
i pwig3
P
i ti+
P
i ui γ
(1)
0 = g1 γ
(2)
0 = g2 γ
(3)
0 = g3
This round is done sequentially, for i=1,. . . ,n.
Upon receiving (γ(0)j , γ
(1)
j , γ
(2)
j , γ
(3)
j ) for j = 1, . . . , i− 1,
check CDH(γ(0)j−1, γ
(0)
j , γ
(1)
j−1, γ
(1)
j ),CDH(γ
(0)
j−1, γ
(0)
j , γ
(2)
j−1, γ
(2)
j )
and CDH(γ(0)j−1, γ
(0)
j , γ
(3)
j−1, γ
(3)
j ); abort if one of them is invalid
αi
R← Z∗p γ(0)i = (γ(0)i−1)αi γ(1)i = (γ(1)i−1)αi γ(2)i = (γ(2)i−1)αi
γ
(3)
i = (γ
(3)
i−1)
αi
γ
(0)
i ,γ
(1)
i ,γ
(2)
i ,γ
(3)
i−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(1d) given γ(0)n = gα
P
i pwig3
α(
P
i ti+
P
i ui) γ
(1)
n = g1
α γ
(2)
n = g2
α γ
(3)
n = g3
α
check CDH(γ(0)n−1, γ
(0)
n , γ
(1)
n−1, γ
(1)
n ),CDH(γ
(0)
n−1, γ
(0)
n , γ
(2)
n−1, γ
(2)
n )
and CDH(γ(0)n−1, γ
(0)
n , γ
(3)
n−1, γ
(3)
n )
for all i, Pi computes G1,i = (γ(1)n )ti , G2,i = (γ(2)n )ui ,
G3,i = (γ
(3)
n )
ti , G4,i = (γ
(3)
n )
ui
G1,i,G2,i,G3,i,G4,i−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
U
n
b
li
n
d
in
g
R
in
g
z
}|
{ (1e) given, for j = 1, . . . , n G1,j , G2,j , G3,j , G4,j
check CDH(g1, C′j
(1)
, γ
(1)
n , G1,j),CDH(g2, C
′
j
(2)
, γ
(2)
n , G2,j),
CDH(γ
(1)
n , G1,j , γ
(3)
n , G3,j) and CDH(γ(2)n , G2,j , γ(3)n , G4,j)
ζn+1 = γ
(0)
n /
“Q
j G3,jG4,j
”
= gα
P
j pwj
This round is done sequentially, for i from n down to 1.
given, for j from n down to i+ 1, ζj , check CDH(γ(1)j−1, γ
(1)
j , ζj , ζj+1)
ζi = (ζi+1)
1/αi
ζi−→
(1f) given, for j from i− 1 down to 1, ζj , check CDH(γ(1)j−1, γ(1)j , ζj , ζj+1)
pk = ζ1
Fig. 1. Individual steps of the distributed key generation protocol
After these rounds of commitments/encryptions, a verification step allows for all the players to
check whether the public key and the passwords are compatible. Note that at this point, everything
has become publicly verifiable so that the group leader will not be able to cheat and make the other
players believe that everything is correct when it is not. Verification starts from the ciphertexts C ′i,
and involves a blinding and an unblinding ring as described above. This ends with a decision by the
group leader on whether to abort the protocol (when the passwords are incompatible) or go on to
the computation step. Every user is able to check the validity of the group leader’s decision, as in the
former protocol.
If the group leader decides to go on, the players assist it in the computation of csk, again with
the help of a blinding and an unblinding rings, starting from the ciphertexts Ai. However, note that
this time, the group leader does not reveal the values G′1,1 = (δ
(1)
n )v1 , G′2,1 = (δ
(2)
n )w1 , G′3,1 = (δ
(3)
n )v1
and G′4,1 = (δ
(3)
n )w1 at the end of the blinding ring, but it is the only one able to compute cβ
P
j pwj .
Instead of revealing it to the others, it chooses at random an exponent x R← Z∗q and broadcasts the
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value cβx
P
j pwj . The unblinding ring then takes place as before, leading to a public value cβ1x
P
j pwj
that the environment cannot distinguish from random thanks to the random exponent x. Furthermore,
the whole process is robust, which means that nobody can make the decryption result become incorrect.
Except of course the group leader itself who broadcasts any value it wants as ζ ′n+1, without having to
prove anything. But this does not help it to obtain a computation which it could not do alone, except
the result csk.
Note that if at some point a user fails to send its value (denial of service attack) or if the adversary
modifies a flow (man-in-the-middle attack), the protocol will fail. In the ideal world this means that
the simulator makes a computation delivery query to the functionality with a bit b set to zero. Because
of the public verifications of the CDH values, in these blinding/unblinding rounds exactly the same
sequence of passwords as in the first rounds has to be used by the players. This necessarily implies
compatibility with the public key, but may be an even stronger condition.
As a side note, observe that all the blinding rings in the verification and computation steps could
be made concurrent instead of sequential, to simplify the protocol. Notice however that the final
unblinding ring of csk in the computation step should only be carried out after the public key and the
committed passwords are known to be compatible, and the passwords to be the same in both sequences
of commitments/encryptions, i.e. after the verification step succeeded.
All the witness-indistinguishable and SSNIZK proofs and arguments will be described in Section 6.
We show in Appendix B that we can efficiently simulate these computations without the knowledge
of the pwi’s, so that they do not reveal anything more about the pwi’s than pk already does. More
precisely, we show that such computations are indistinguishable to A under the DLin assumption.
Security Theorems. Assuming that the proofs of membership WIProofBit and SSNIZKEq are
instantiated as described in Section 6 (relying on the CDH), we have the following results, provided
that DLin is infeasible in G and H is collision-resistant. The proofs of these theorems can be found in
Appendix B.
Theorem 1 Let F̂pwDistPublicKeyGen be the concurrent multi-session extension of FpwDistPublicKeyGen. The
distributed key generation protocol in Figure 1 securely realizes F̂pwDistPublicKeyGen for ElGamal key
generation, in the CRS model, in the presence of static adversaries.
Theorem 2 Let F̂pwDistPrivateComp be the concurrent multi-session extension of FpwDistPrivateComp. The
distributed decryption protocol in Figure 2 securely realizes F̂pwDistPrivateComp for ElGamal decryption,
in the CRS model, in the presence of static adversaries.
As stated above, our protocols are only proven secure against static adversaries. Unlike adaptive
ones, static adversaries are only allowed to corrupt protocol participants prior to the beginning of the
protocol execution.
5 Extensions of the Protocols
Boneh-Franklin IBE Scheme [6]. We need to compute did = H(id)sk where H(id) is a public
hash of a user’s identity. This is analogous to csk, and thus our protocol works as is.
Boneh-Boyen (BB1) IBE Scheme [4]. Here, did is randomized and of the form (h0sk(hid1 h2)r, h3
r).
Since (h0sk) is a private value, the protocol can be adapted as follows: 1) In the commitment steps, the
user also commits (once) in (2a) to a value ri, which will be its share of r. 2) Up to (2f), everything
works as before in order to check pk (there is no need to check r, constructed on the fly). 3) The
blinding rings are made in parallel, one for (h0sk)β , one for ((hid1 h2)r)β , and one for (h3
r)β , the CDH
being checked to ensure that the same r and βi are used each time. 4) The players obtain (h0sk(hid1 h2)r)β
and the unblinding ring is made globally for this value. An unblinding ring is also done for (h3r)β , with
the same verification for the exponents βi.
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{ (2a) = (1a) {Ci,j ,Π0i,j}j−−−−−−−−→
(2b) = (1b) except vi, wi
R← Z∗p
Ai = Encryptc(pwi, vi, wi) = (g1
vi , g2
wi , cpwig3
vi+wi)
Π2i = SSNIZKEqg,c(C
′
i, Ai)
C′i,Ai,Π
2
i−−−−−−→
B
li
n
d
.
R
in
g z}|{
(2c) = (1c)
γ
(1)
i ,γ
(2)
i ,Π
2
i−−−−−−−−→
(2d) = (1d)
(G1,i,G2,i,G3,i,G4,i)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
U
n
b
li
n
d
.
R
in
g z}|{ (2e) = (1e)
ζi−→
(2f) = (1f) pk ?= ζ1
B
li
n
d
in
g
R
in
g
z
}|
{ (3a) abort if one of the signatures σi is invalid
δ
(0)
0 =
Q
iAi
(3) = c
P
i pwig3
P
i vi+
P
i wi δ
(1)
0 = g1 δ
(2)
0 = g2 δ
(3)
0 = g3
P1 chooses at random β1
R← Z∗p and computes
δ
(0)
1 = (δ
(0)
0 )
β1 δ
(1)
1 = (δ
(1)
0 )
β1 δ
(2)
1 = (δ
(2)
0 )
β1 δ
(3)
1 = (δ
(3)
0 )
β1
This round is done sequentially, for i=2,. . . ,n.
Upon receiving (δ(0)j , δ
(1)
j , δ
(2)
j , δ
(3)
j ) for j = 1, . . . , i− 1,
check CDH(δ(0)j−1, δ
(0)
j , δ
(1)
j−1, δ
(1)
j ),CDH(δ
(0)
j−1, δ
(0)
j , δ
(2)
j−1, δ
(2)
j ),
CDH(δ
(0)
j−1, δ
(0)
j , δ
(3)
j−1, δ
(3)
j ); abort if one of them is invalid
βi
R← Z∗p
δ
(0)
i = (δ
(0)
i−1)
βi δ
(1)
i = (δ
(1)
i−1)
βi δ
(2)
i = (δ
(2)
i−1)
βi δ
(3)
i = (δ
(3)
i−1)
βi
δ
(1)
i ,δ
(2)
i−−−−−→
(3b) given δ(0)n = cβ
P
i pwig3
β(
P
i vi+
P
i wi) δ
(1)
n = g1
β δ
(2)
n = g2
β δ
(3)
n = g3
β
check CDH(δ(0)n−1, δ
(0)
n , δ
(1)
n−1, δ
(1)
n ),CDH(δ
(0)
n−1, δ
(0)
n , δ
(2)
n−1, δ
(2)
n )
CDH(δ
(0)
n−1, δ
(0)
n , δ
(3)
n−1, δ
(3)
n )
for i 6= 1, Pi computes G′1,i = (δ(1)n )vi , G′2,i = (δ(2)n )wi ,
G′3,i = (δ
(3)
n )
vi , G′4,i = (δ
(3)
n )
wi
G′1,i,G
′
2,i,G
′
3,i,G
′
4,i−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
U
n
b
li
n
d
in
g
R
in
g
z
}|
{ (3c) given, for j = 1, . . . , n G′1,j , G′2,j , G′3,j , G′4,j
check CDH(g1, Aj(1), δ(1)n , G′1,j),CDH(g2, Aj(2), δ
(2)
n , G
′
2,j),
CDH(δ
(1)
n , G
′
1,j , δ
(3)
n , G
′
3,j) and CDH(δ
(2)
n , G
′
2,j , δ
(3)
n , G
′
4,j)
P1 computes G′1,1=(δ
(1)
n )
v1 , G′2,1=(δ
(2)
n )
w1 , G′3,1 = (δ
(3)
n )
v1 , G′4,1 = (δ
(3)
n )
w1
P1 chooses at random x
R← Z∗p
and computes ζ′n+1 =
“
δ
(0)
n /
Q
j(G
′
3,jG
′
4,j)
”x
= cβx
P
j pwj
ζ′n+1−−−→
This round is done sequentially, for i from n down to 2.
Upon receiving, for j from n down to i+ 1 ζ′j
check CDH(δ(1)j−1, δ
(1)
j , ζ
′
j , ζ
′
j+1)
ζ′i = (ζ
′
i+1)
1/βi
ζ′i−→
(3d) given, for j from i− 1 down to 2 ζ′j
check CDH(γ(1)j−1, γ
(1)
j , ζ
′
j , ζ
′
j+1)
P1 gets ζ′1 = (ζ′2)1/β1 = cx
P
pwi = cxsk and finally csk
Fig. 2. Individual steps of the distributed decryption protocol
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Linear Decryptions [5]. Let (f = g1/x, g, h = g1/y) be the public key of a linear encryption
scheme, (x, y) being the private key. Assuming z = y/x, these keys can be seen as pk = (hz, hy, h) and
sk = (y, z). Using these notations,
c = Epk(m; r) = (c1, c2, c3) = (f r, hs,mgr+s)
m = Dsk(c) = c3(c1xc2y)−1 = mgr+sg−rg−s
In the first protocol, the players need to use two passwords zi and yi to create the public key pk.
In the second one, the commitment steps are doubled to commit to both zi and yi. As soon as pk is
checked, the blinding rings are made separately, one for (c1x)β and one for (c2y)β . The players obtain
(c1xc2y)β and the unblinding ring can be made globally for this value. In both rings, the CDH is checked
to ensure that the same βi is used each time.
6 Employed Proof Systems
6.1 GOS WI Proof of Commitments Being to Bits
Let (g1, g2, g3) ∈ G3 be a “basis” and let (U1, U2, g) ∈ G3 be a commitment key (which is in general
non-linear w.r.t. (g1, g2, g3), but for simulation purposes it will be linear). Let C = (Ux1 gr1, Ux2 gs2, gxg
r+s
3 )
be a commitment to x using randomness (r, s). Groth et al. [13] construct a WI proof system to show
that one of two triples is linear. Applying it to (C1, C2, C3) and (C1U−11 , C2U
−1
2 , C3g
−1) yields a proof
that x ∈ {0, 1}, thus implements WIProofBit, in an efficient way and without random oracles. A proof
consists of 6 group elements and is verified by 6 equations using 18 pairings in total. To simulate,
one chooses (U1, U2, g) to be linear, thus the commitment C is linear whether x is 0 or 1. Witness
indistinguishability of the proof guarantees that the case where the commitments and the proofs where
constructed for x = 0 is perfectly indistinguishable from the case x = 1.
We provide below more details how to implement WIProofBit: choose t← Zp and set
pi1,1 := U
(2x−1)r
1 g
r2
1 pi1,2 = U
(2x−1)r
2 g
t+rs
2 pi1,3 := g
−(2x−1)rg−t−(r+s)r3
pi2,1 := U
(2x−1)s
1 g
−t+rs
1 pi2,2 = U
(2x−1)s
2 g
s2
2 pi2,3 := g
−(2x−1)sgt−(r+s)s3
A proof pi = (pi1,1, . . . , pi2,3) for a commitment (C1, C2, C3) is verified by checking:
e(g1, pi1,1) = e(C1, C1U−11 ) e(g1, pi1,2)e(g2, pi2,1) = e(C1, C2U
−1
2 )e(C2, C1U
−1
1 )
e(g2, pi2,2) = e(C2, C2U−12 ) e(g1, pi1,3)
−1e(g3, pi1,1pi2,1) = e(C1, C3g−1)e(C3, C1U−11 )
e(g3, pi1,3pi2,3)−1 = e(C3, C3g−1) e(g2, pi2,3)−1e(g3, pi1.2pi2,2) = e(C2, C3g−1)e(C3, C2U−12 )
Correctness.We show correctness of two exemplary equations. The first one: e(g1, pi1,1) = e(gr1, U
2x−1
1 g
r
1)
which is e(C1, C1U−11 ) when x = 0 and e(C1U
−1
1 , C1) when x = 1. The fourth equation:
e(g1, pi1,3)−1e(g3, pi1,1pi2,1) = e(g1, g(2x−1)rg
t+(r+s)r
3 )e(g3, U
(2x−1)r
1 g
r2
1 U
(2x−1)s
1 g
−t+rs
1 )
= e(gr1, g
2x−1)e(g1, gt3)e(g
r
1, g
r+s
3 )e(g
r
3, U
2x−1
1 )e(g
r
3, g
r
1)e(g
s
3, U
2x−1
1 )e(g3, g
−t
1 )e(g
s
3, g
r
1)
= e(gr1, g
2x−1gr+s3 )e(g
r+s
3 , U
2x−1
1 )e(g
r+s
3 , g
r
1) = e(g
r
1, g
2x−1gr+s3 )e(g
r+s
3 , U
2x−1
1 g
r
1)
= e(C1, C3g−1)e(C3, C1U−11 )
The remaining equations are shown to hold analogously.
Soundness. Let (U1, U2, g) be a binding commitment key, let C = (Ux1 gr1, Ux2 gs2, gxg
r+s
3 ) (note that for
any C, there exist such x, r, s), and let pi be a proof for C that passes verification.
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Define ρ := logg1 U1, σ := logg2 U2, τ := logg3 g, define mi,j := loggj pii,j Then from the verification
relation we get
m1,1 = (ρx+ r)(ρ(x− 1) + r)
m1,2 +m2,1 = (ρx+ r)(σ(x− 1) + s) + (σx+ s)(ρ(x− 1) + r)
m2,2 = (σx+ s)(σ(x− 1) + s)
−m1,3 +m1,1 +m2,1 = (ρx+ r)(τ(x− 1) + r + s) + (τx+ r + s)(ρ(x− 1) + r)
−m1,3 −m2,3 = (τx+ r + s)(τ(x− 1) + r + s)
−m2,3 +m1,2 +m2,2 = (σx+ s)(τ(x− 1) + r + s) + (τx+ r + s)(σ(x− 1) + s)
If we add the first, second, third and fifth equation and substract the fourth and sixth, we get 0 on
the left-hand side, whereas the right-hand side simplifies to (ρ2 + σ2 + τ2 +2ρσ− 2ρτ − 2στ)x(x− 1).
Thus (ρ+ σ − τ)2x(x− 1) = 0, which implies x = 0 or x = 1, since for a binding commitment key (a
non-linear triple), we have ρ+ σ 6= τ .
Witness Indistinguishability. If the commitment key is witness hiding, i.e., (U1, U2, g) is linear
w.r.t. (g1, g2, g3), then C is linear, be it computed for x = 0 or x = 1. Moreover, we show that the two
cases entail the same proof.
Let U1 = g
ρ
1 , U2 = g
σ
2 , g = g
ρ+σ
3 . Let the commitment and proof be produced for x = 0, i.e.,
C = (gr1, g
s
2, g
r+s
3 ) and
pi1,1 = U−r1 g
r2
1 pi1,2 = U
−r
2 g
t+rs
2 pi1,3 = g
rg
−t−(r+s)r
3
pi2,1 = U−s1 g
−t+rs
1 pi2,2 = U
−s
2 g
s2
2 pi2,3 = g
sg
t−(r+s)s
3 (1)
However, C could also be the result of “committing” to 1 and using randomness (r′ = r−ρ, s′ = s−σ),
since C = (gr1, gs2, g
r+s
3 ) = (U1g
r′
1 , U2g
s′
1 , gg
r′+s′
3 ). We show that using witness x = 1 and (r
′, s′), and
randomness t′ := t+ ρs− σr for the proof generates the same proofs as in (1):
pi′1,1 = U
r′
1 g
(r′)2
1 = g
ρ(r−ρ)+(r2−2ρr+ρ2)
1 = g
−ρr+r2
1 = U
−r
1 g
r2
1 = pi1,1
pi′1,2 = U
r′
2 g
t′+r′s′
2 = g
σ(r−ρ)+(t+ρs−σr)+(rs−ρs−σr+ρσ)
2 = g
−σr+t+rs
2 = U
−r
2 g
t+rs
2 = pi1,2
pi′1,3 = g
−r′g−t
′−(r′+s′)r′
3 = g
−(ρ+σ)(r−ρ)−(t+ρs−σr)−(r+s−ρ−σ)(r−ρ)
3 = g
−t−r2−sr+σr+ρr
3 = pi1,3
pi′2,1 = U
s′
1 g
−t′+r′s′
1 = g
ρ(s−σ)−(t+ρs−σr)+(rs−ρs−σr+ρσ)
1 = g
−t+rs−ρs
1 = pi2,1
pi′2,2 = U
s′
2 g
(s′)2
2 = g
σ(s−σ)+(s2−2σs+σ2)
2 = g
σs+s2
2 = pi2,2
pi′2,3 = g
−s′gt
′−(r′+s′)s′
3 = g
−(ρ+σ)(s−σ)+(t+ρs−σr)−(r+s−ρ−σ)(s−σ)
3 = g
t−rs−s2+ρsσs
3 = pi2,3
6.2 Simulation-Sound NIZK Arguments for Relations of Ciphertexts and Commitments
We construct two simulation-sound NIZK argument systems implementing the proof SSNIZKEq. Given
two ciphertexts, the first proves that the encrypted messages m1 and m2 are in CDH w.r.t. some fixed
basis (c, d), i.e., m1 = cµ and m2 = dµ for some µ. The second SSNIZK proves that for a given linear
commitment to x and a linear encryption of gy it holds that x = y. We follow the overall approach
by Groth [12] to obtain simulation soundness, but using the Groth-Sahai proof system [14] we get an
efficient result: the proofs themselves are efficient, and we need not encrypt some of the witnesses in
order to guarantee extractability, as the employed Groth-Sahai proofs are witness extractable.
Overview. We start with some intuition on how [12] constructs simulation-sound proofs for sat-
isfiability of a set of pairing product equations (PPEs) {Ek}KEk=1 (and later show how to express the
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statements we want to prove this way). Let Σot be a strong one-time signature scheme1 and let Σcma
be a signature scheme that is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attack (EUF-CMA), and
whose signatures σ on a message M are verified by checking a set of PPEs over a verification key vk
and M , denoted {Vk(vk,M, σ)}KVk=1.
The common reference string (CRS) of our argument system will contain a verification key vk for
Σcma (whose corresponding signing key serves as simulation trapdoor). When making an argument, one
first chooses a key pair (vkot, skot) for Σot, proves a statement and, at the end, adds a signature under
vkot on the instance and the proof. The statement one actually proves is the following: to either know
a witness satisfying Equations {Ek} or to know a signature on vkot valid under vk. Groth [12] shows
how to construct a new set of equations which is satisfiable iff {Ek} or {Vk(vk, vkot, ·)} are satisfiable.
Moreover, knowing witnesses for either of them, one can compute witnesses of the new set of equations.
Using the techniques of [14], one then commits to the witnesses and proves that the committed values
satisfy the new PPEs in a witness-indistinguishable (WI) way.
To simulate an argument, after choosing a pair (vkot, skot), one uses the trapdoor to produce a
signature σ on vkot valid under vk and uses σ as a witness for {Vk(vk, vkot, ·)}. (It follows from WI of
the Groth-Sahai proof that this is indistinguishable from using a witness for {Ek}.) Even after seeing
many proofs of this kind, no adversary is able to produce one for a new false statement: Since it has
to sign the instance and the argument at the end, it must choose a new pair (vk∗ot, sk
∗
ot) (by one-time
security of Σot). Soundness of Groth-Sahai proofs imposes that to prove a false statement (meaning
that the first clause of the disjunction is not satisfiable), it must use a witness for the second clause,
thus know a signature on vkot. This however is infeasible by EUF-CMA of Σcma (since we can extract
the witnesses and thus a forged signature). We start by instantiating the mentioned building blocks.
Building Blocks. The main motivation for our choices of instantiations of these blocks is that their
security is implied by DLin only. We insist that by admitting more exotic assumptions, the efficiency
of our proof system could be improved.
The Strong One-Time Signature Scheme Σot. We pick the scheme described in [12] (but any
other would equally do), since its security follows from the discrete-log assumption which is implied
by DLin.
The Waters Signature Scheme. The signature scheme from [16] suits our purposes, it requires no
additional assumption and—more importantly—signatures are verified by checking PPEs.
Setup. In a bilinear group (p,G,GT , e, g), define parameters f ← G∗ and h := (h0, h1, . . . , h`)← G`+1.
A secret key x ← Zp defines a public key X := gx. For ease of notation, define W(M) :=
h0
∏`
i=1 h
Mi
i .
Signing. To sign a messageM ∈ {0, 1}`, choose r ← Zp and define a signature as σ := (fxW(M)r, g−r).
Verification. A signature σ = (σ1, σ2) is accepted for message M iff
e(σ1, g) e(W(M), σ2) = e(f,X) (2)
Security. EUF-CMA follows from the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption which is implied by
DLin.
The Groth-Sahai Proof System. Consider a set of pairing product equations {Ek}KEk=1 on variables
{Xi}ni=1 in G of the form n∏
i=1
e(Ak,i, Xi)
n∏
i=1
n∏
j=1
e(Xi, Xj)γk,i,j = Tk (Ek)
for given Ak,i ∈ G, γk,i,j ∈ Zp, and Tk ∈ GT . Groth and Sahai [14] build a non-interactive witness-
indistinguishable proof of satisfiability of {Ek} from which—given a trapdoor—can be extracted the
witnesses Xi (we will use their instantiation with DLin): the common reference string is a (binding) key
for linear commitments to group elements. The proof consists of commitments to eachXi and 9 elements
1 A signature scheme is strong one-time if no adversary, after getting a signature σ on one message m of his choice, can
produce a valid pair (m∗, σ∗) 6= (m,σ).
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of G per equation proving that it is satisfied by the committed values. By DLin, replacing the CRS by
a hiding commitment key is indistinguishable. In this setting now every witness {Xi}ni=1 satisfying the
equations generates the same distribution of proofs, which implies witness-indistinguishability of the
proofs.
Moreover, we assume a collision-resistant hash function H that maps strings of elements of G to
elements in Zp which we identify with their bit-representation in {0, 1}dlog pe. Thus, when we say we
sign a vector of group elements, we actually mean that we sign their hash values.
Equations for Proof of Plaintexts Being in CDH. Let c, d ∈ G be fixed and let (g1, g2, g3) be
a linear encryption key. Given two ciphertexts C = (gr1, gs2,m1g
r+s
3 ) and D = (g
t
1, g
u
2 ,m2g
t+u
3 ), we give
a set of PPEs that are satisfiable by a witness a if and only if there exists µ ∈ Zp such that m1 = cµ
and m2 = dµ.
e(C1, g3) = e(g1, a1) e(C2, g3) = e(g2, a2) (3)
e(D1, g3) = e(g1, a3) e(D2, g3) = e(g2, a4) e(C3a−11 a
−1
2 , d) = e(c,D3a
−1
3 a
−1
4 )
The witness satisfying them is a := (gr3, gs3, gt3, gu3 ). The first four equations prove that the loga-
rithms of the ai’s are those of C1, C2, D1, D2 w.r.t. their respective bases. Thus, C3a−11 a
−1
2 = m1 and
D3a
−1
3 a
−1
4 = m2 and the last equation shows that (m1,m2) is in CDH w.r.t. (c, d).
Disjunction of Equations. Following [12] (and optimizing since the pairings have variables in
common), we define a set of equations which we can prove satisfiable if we have witnesses for either (3)
or (2), i.e., if we either know a satisfying (3) or σ satisfying (2). We first introduce the following new
variables:
χ1, χ2 φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4, φ5 ψ1, ψ2, ψ3
We define the following 15 equations expressing a disjunction of (3) and (2), therefore termed
“(3 ∨ 2)”.
Equation for Disjunction: e(g−1χ1χ2, g) = 1
From (2): e(χ2, ψ−11 σ1) = 1 e(χ2, ψ
−1
2 W(M)) = 1 e(χ2, ψ−13 f) = 1
e(ψ1, g) e(ψ2, σ2) e(ψ3, X)−1 = 1
From (3): e(χ1, φ−11 g1) = 1 e(χ1, φ
−1
2 g2) = 1
e(χ1, φ−13 g3) = 1 e(χ1, φ
−1
4 c) = 1 e(χ1, φ
−1
5 d) = 1
e(C1, φ3) e(φ1, a1)−1 = 1 e(C2, φ3) e(φ2, a2) = 1
e(D1, φ3) e(φ1, a3)−1 = 1 e(D2, φ3) e(φ2, a4) = 1
e(C3a−11 a
−1
2 , φ5) e(φ4, D3a
−1
3 a
−1
4 ) = 1
Completeness. To produce a proof we proceed as follows: If we have an assignment a for (3), we
choose χ1 := g, χ2 := 1, satisfying thus the first equation. Moreover, set φ1 := g1, φ2 := g2, φ3 := g3,
φ4 := c, φ5 := d. Thus the equations of the block for (3) are satisfied, because a is a witness for (3).
Since χ2 = 1, we can set ψi := 1 (for all i) as well, which satisfies the block for (2), no matter what
value we set σ.
On the other hand, if we know a signature σ satisfying (2), we choose χ1 := φi := 1 (for all i) and
χ2 := g, ψ1 := σ1, ψ2 :=W(M), ψ3 := f and get a satisfying assignment for any choice of a.
Soundness. We show that if (3 ∨ 2) is satisfied then either a satisfies (3) or σ satisfies (2): From the
first equation we have that either χ1 or χ2 must be non-trivial, which either confines the values of the
φi’s to (g1, g2, g3, c, d) or those of the ψi’s to (σ1,W(M), f). Now this imposes that either a satisfies (3)
(by the last five equations of the block for (3)) or σ satisfies (2) (by the last equation of the block
for (2)).
Equations for Proof of Commitment and Ciphertext Containing the Same Value. Let
(g1, g2, g3) be a key for linear encryption, and let (U1, U2, g) be an associated commitment key. Let
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C = (Ux1 g
r
1, U
x
2 g
s
2, g
xgr+s3 ) be a commitment to x and D = (g
v
1 , g
w
2 , g
ygv+w3 ) be an encryption of g
y. We
prove that x = y: the witness is (a1 = Ux1 , a2 = Ux2 , a3 = gx, a4 = gr3, a5 = gv3) satisfying
e(a1, U2) = e(U1, a2) e(C1a
−1
1 , g3) = e(g1, a4) e(D1, g3) = e(g1, a5)
e(a1, g) = e(U1, a3) e(C2a
−1
2 , g3) = e(g2, C3a
−1
3 a
−1
4 ) e(D2, g3) = e(g2, D3a
−1
3 a
−1
5 ) (4)
The equations in the first column show that a1 = U z1 , a2 = U z2 , a3 = gz for some z, the second
column proves that (C1a−11 , C2a
−1
2 , C3a
−1
2 ) is linear (i.e., C commits to z) and the third that D is an
encryption of a3 = gz.
Transformation. Transforming Equations (4) and (2) to a set (4∨2) analogously to the construction
of (3∨2), we get a set of 16 equations we can prove satisfiable adding 10 new witnesses if either we have
a witness for C being a commitment to some x and D an encryption of gx, or we know a signature.
(Associate the φi’s to U1, a1, g1, g2 and g3.)
Assembling the Pieces. We describe the SSNIZK proof system for “plaintexts in CDH”. The one
for “commitment and ciphertext contain the same value” is obtained by replacing (3 ∨ 2) by (4 ∨ 2).
Common Reference String. Generate a key pair (vk, sk) for Waters’ signature scheme, and a CRS
crsGS for the Groth-Sahai proof system. Let crs := (vk, crsGS) and let the simulation trapdoor be
sk.
Proof. Let (C,D) ∈ G6 be an instance and a a witness satisfying (3). Generate a key pair (vkot, skot)
for Σot; using witness a, make a Groth-Sahai proof piGS w.r.t. crsGS of satisfiability of (3∨ 2) with
M := vkot; produce a signature σot on (C,D, vkot, piGS) using skot. The proof is pi := (vkot, piGS, σot)
Verification. Given pi, verify σot on (C,D, vkot, piGS) under vkot, and piGS on the respective equa-
tions.
Simulation. Proceed as in Proof, but using sk produce σ on vkot and use that as a witness for
(3 ∨ 2).
Theorem 3 Under the DLin assumption, the above is a simulation-sound NIZK argument for the
encryptions of two linear ciphertexts forming a CDH-pair.
Using the ideas given in the overview, the proof is analogous to that in [12] except that we do not
require perfect soundness and that we use the extraction key for crsGS to extract a forged signature on
vkot directly rather than adding encryptions to the proof.
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A The UC Framework
The aim of the UC security model is to ensure that UC-secure protocols will continue to behave in
the ideal way even if executed in arbitrary environments. This model relies on the indistinguishability
between two worlds, the ideal world and the real world. In the ideal world, the security is provided by
an ideal functionality F .
One can think of it as a trusted party in the context of multi-party computation: this functionality
interacts with n users having to compute a function f . These users give their inputs to F , which gives
them back their outputs. We stress that there is no communication between the users. F ensures that
the computation is correct and that the users learn nothing more than their own inputs and outputs.
Security is then guaranteed since an adversary A can only learn and thus modify the data of corrupted
users.
In order to prove that a protocol Π emulates F , one considers an environment Z that provides
inputs to the users and acts as a distinguisher between the real world (with actual users and a real
adversary that can control some of them and also the communication among them) and the ideal
world (with dummy users interacting only with the ideal functionality F , and a simulated adversary
also interacting with F). We then say that the protocol Π realizes F if for all polynomial adversaries A,
there exists a polynomial simulator S such that no polynomial environment Z can distinguish between
the two worlds (one with F and S, the other with Π and A) with a significant advantage.
Since there are several copies of a functionality F running in parallel, each one has a unique session
identifier sid. All the messages must contain the SID of the copy they are intended for. As in [9], we
assume for simplicity that each protocol realizing F has inputs containing its SID. We also assume
that each user starts a session by specifying the SID of F , its identity Pi, its password pwi, and the
identities of the other users Pid.
A shortcoming of the UC theorem is that is says nothing about protocols sharing state and ran-
domness (it ensures the security of a single unit only). Here, since we need a common reference string
for all instances of the protocol, we need a stronger result, provided by Canetti and Rabin in [10] and
called universal composability with joint state. Informally, they define the multi-session extension F̂
of F , which basically runs multiple instances of F , where each of them is identified by a sub-session
identifier ssid. F̂ has to be executed with sid and ssid. When it receives a message m containing ssid,
it hands m to the copy of F having the SSID ssid (or invokes a new one if such copy does not exist).
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For the sake of generality, we shall describe all the functionalities in the context of adaptive adver-
saries, that are allowed to corrupt users whenever they like to. For simplicity, however, we shall only
prove the security of our constructions in presence of static adversaries, that have to choose which users
to corrupt before the beginning of the execution of the protocol, either implicitly in the key generation
protocol (when the adversary starts playing as one of the parties, choosing by himself the password),
or explicitly in the decryption protocol (asking a corruption before a new decryption session).
In the UC model, a corruption implies a complete access to the internal memory of the users (which
here means the password and the internal state); in addition, the adversary takes the entire control of
the corrupted user, and can modify its behavior for the remaining of the protocol.
B Proof of the Security Theorems
In this section we give the proof that the protocols described on Figures 1 and 2 (in Section 4) re-
spectively realize the functionalities FpwDistPublicKeyGen and FpwDistPrivateComp. These ideal functionalities
have been described in Section 2 and can be found in Figures 3 and 4. The split functionality is given
in Figure 5.
The functionality FpwDistPublicKeyGen is parametrized by a security parameter k and an efficiently computable function
PublicKeyGen : (pw1, pw2, . . . , pwn) 7→ pk that derives a public key pk from a set of passwords. Denote by role either
player or leader. The functionality interacts with an adversary S and a set of parties P1,. . . ,Pn via the following
queries:
Initialization. Upon receiving a query (newSession, sid, P id, Pi, pwi, role) from user Pi for the first time, where Pid
is a set of at least two distinct identities containing Pi, ignore it if role = leader and if there is already a record of
the form (sid, P id, ∗, ∗, leader). Record (sid, P id, Pi, pwi, role) and send (sid, P id, Pi, role) to S. Ignore any subsequent
query (newSession, sid, P id′, ∗, ∗, ∗) where Pid′ 6= Pid.
If there are already |Pid| − 1 recorded tuples (sid, P id, Pj , pwj) for Pj ∈ Pid \ {Pi}, and exactly one of them such
that role = leader, then while recording the |Pid|-th tuple, also record (sid, P id, ready) and send this to S. Otherwise,
record (sid, P id, error) and send (sid, P id, error) to S.
Key Computation. Upon receiving a message (compute, sid, P id) from the adversary S where there is a recorded
tuple (sid, P id, ready), then compute pk = PublicKeyGen(pw1, . . . , pwn) and record (sid, P id, pk).
Leader Key Delivery. Upon receiving a message (leaderDeliver, sid, P id, b) from the adversary S for the first time,
where there is a recorded tuple (sid, P id, pk) and a record (sid, P id, Pi, pwi, leader), send (sid, P id, pk) to Pi and to S
if b = 1, or (sid, P id, error) otherwise. Record (sid, P id, sent) and send this to S.
Player Key Delivery. Upon receiving a message (playerDeliver, sid, P id, b, Pi) from S where there are recorded tu-
ples (sid, P id, pk), (sid, P id, Pi, pwi, player) and (sid, P id, sent), send (sid, P id, pk) to Pi if b = 1, or (sid, P id, error)
otherwise.
User Corruption. If S corrupts Pi ∈ Pid where there is a recorded tuple (sid, P id, Pi, pwi), then reveal pwi to S. If
there also is a recorded tuple (sid, P id, pk) and if (sid, P id, pk) has not yet been sent to Pi, send (sid, P id, pk) to S.
Fig. 3. The Distributed Key Generation Functionality FpwDistPublicKeyGen
The proof of the distributed key generation protocol is similar to that of the distributed private
computation given below, with the added simplification that there is no verification step and the
difference that all the users receive the result in the end (which corresponds exactly to what happens
in the private computation protocol at the end of the verification step, where everyone also receives
the result). Thus, we refer to the proof of the private computation protocol for the workings of the
simulation. The additional simplification implied by the adversary receiving the result in the end will
be given in remarks. The structure of the proof is similar to that of Abdalla et al. in [1].
B.1 Methodology of the Proof
The objective of the proof is to construct, from a real-world adversary A, an ideal-world simulator S,
so that the behavior of A in the real world and that of S in the ideal world are indistinguishable to
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The functionality FpwDistPrivateComp is parametrized by a security parameter k and three functions. PublicKeyVer is a
boolean function defined by PublicKeyVer : (pw1, pw2, . . . , pwn, pk) 7→ b, where b = 1 if the passwords and the public
key are compatible, b = 0 otherwise. SecretKeyGen is a function SecretKeyGen : (pw1, pw2, . . . , pwn) 7→ sk, where sk is
the secret key obtained from the passwords. Finally, PrivateComp is a private-key function PrivateComp : (sk, c) 7→ m,
where sk is the secret key, c is the function input (e.g., a ciphertext) and m the private result of the computation (e.g.,
the decrypted message). Denote by role either player or leader. The functionality interacts with an adversary S and
a set of parties P1,. . . ,Pn via the following queries:
– Initialization. Upon receiving a query (newSession, sid, P id, Pi, pk, c, pwi, role) from user Pi for the first time,
where Pid is a set of at least two distinct identities containing Pi, ignore it if role = leader and if there is
already a record of the form (sid, P id, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, leader). Record (sid, P id, Pi, pk, c, pwi, role), mark it fresh, and send
(sid, P id, Pi, pk, c, role) to S. Ignore any subsequent query (newSession, sid, P id′, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗) where Pid′ 6= Pid.
If there are already |Pid| − 1 recorded tuples (sid, P id, Pi, pk, c, pwi, role), and exactly one of them such that
role = leader, then after recording the |Pid|-th tuple, verify that the values of c and pk are the same for all the
users. If the tuples do not fulfill all of these conditions, report (sid, P id, error) to S and stop. Otherwise, record
(sid, P id, pk, c, ready) and send it to S.
– Private Computation. Upon receiving a message (compute, sid, P id) from S where there is a recorded tuple
(sid, P id, pk, c, ready), then
• If all records are fresh and PublicKeyVer(pw1, . . . , pwn, pk) = 1, then
compute sk = SecretKeyGen(pw1, . . . , pwn) and m = PrivateComp(sk, c), and store (sid, P id,m).
Next, for all Pi ∈ Pid mark the record (sid, P id, Pi, pk, c, pwi, role) as complete.
• In any other case, store (sid, P id, error).
When the computation result is set, report the outcome (either error or complete) to S.
– Leader Computation Delivery. Upon receiving a message of the form (leaderDeliver, sid, P id, b) from the adver-
sary S, where both there is a recorded tuple (sid, P id,m) such thatm ∈ {well-formed messages}∪{error}, and there
exists a record (sid, P id, Pi, pk, c, pwi, leader), send (sid, P id,m) to Pi if b is equal to 1, or send (sid, P id, error)
if b is equal to 0. If the group leader Pi is corrupted, then send (sid, P id,m) to S as well (note that S gets m
automatically if Pj is corrupted).
– User Corruption. If S corrupts Pi ∈ Pid where there is a recorded tuple (sid, P id, Pi, pk, c, pwi, role), then
reveal pwi to S. If role = leader, if there also is a recorded tuple (sid, P id,m), and if (sid, P id,m) has not yet
been sent to Pi, then also send (sid, P id,m) to S.
Fig. 4. The Distributed Private Computation Functionality FpwDistPrivateComp
Given a functionality F , the split functionality sF proceeds as follows:
Initialization:
– Upon receiving (Init, sid) from party Pi, send (Init, sid, Pi) to the adversary.
– Upon receiving a message (Init, sid, Pi, H, sidH) from A, where H is a set of party identities, check that Pi has
already sent (Init, sid) and that for all recorded (H ′, sidH′), either H = H ′ and sidH = sidH′ or H and H ′
are disjoint and sidH 6= sidH′ . If so, record the pair (H, sidH), send (Init, sid, sidH) to Pi, and invoke a new
functionality (F , sidH) denoted as FH and with set of honest parties H.
Computation:
– Upon receiving (Input, sid,m) from party Pi, find the set H such that Pi ∈ H and forward m to FH .
– Upon receiving (Input, sid, Pj , H,m) from A, such that Pj /∈ H, forward m to FH as if coming from Pj .
– When FH generates an output m for party Pi ∈ H, send m to Pi. If the output is for Pj /∈ H or for the adversary,
send m to the adversary.
Fig. 5. Split Functionality sF
any environment Z. The ideal functionality is specified in Figure 4 and described in Section 2. Since
we use the joint state version of the UC theorem, we implicitly consider the multi-session extension of
this functionality, and thus replace all sid by (sid, ssid). Note that the passwords of the users depend
on the sub-session considered. For sake of simplicity, we denote them by pwi, but one should implicitly
understand pwi,ssid.
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B.2 Details of the Proof
In this proof, we incrementally define a sequence of games starting from the one describing a real
execution of the protocol and ending up with game G10 which we prove to be indistinguishable with
respect to the ideal experiment.
The simulator S is incrementally defined in the games, ending up to be completely defined in G10
(though we do not rewrite him entirely in this game since his behavior was described in the previous
games). This final game will then be proven to be indistinguishable to the ideal world, showing that
we indeed have constructed an ideal simulator to the real-world adversary A.
In the first games, the simulator has actually access to all the information given to the users by the
environment, in particular their passwords. In the last game, we nearly are in the ideal game so that
the users do not exist anymore: S has only access to the information transmitted by his queries to the
functionality (not to the passwords, for instance) and he has to simulate the users entirely by himself.
Between these two situations, the simulator lives in a world which is not really real, not really ideal.
Following [1], in order to formally model this situation, we chose to consider two hybrid queries
that S can ask to the functionality all along the games. The CompatiblePwd query checks whether the
passwords of the users are compatible with the passwords of the other users and the public key of the
group leader. And the Delivery query gives the result to the group leader–and to the adversary if the
former is corrupted.
Note that since in the first games, the simulator has access to the users’ inputs, he knows their
passwords. In such a case a CompatiblePwd or Delivery query can be easily implemented by letting the
simulator look at the passwords owned by the users. When the users are entirely simulated, without
the knowledge of their passwords, S will replace the queries above with the real Private Computation
and Leader Computation Delivery queries to the functionality.
We say that a flow is oracle-generated if it was sent by an honest user and arrives without any
alteration to the user it was meant to. We say it is non-oracle-generated otherwise, that is either if it
was sent by an honest user and modified by the adversary, or if it was sent by a corrupted user or a
user impersonated by the adversary (more generally denoted by attacked user, that is, a user whose
password is known to the adversary).
Game G0: Real game. In the real game, we know that the protocol cannot continue past the
two initial commitment rounds if there is any inconsistency between the passwords pwi used in all the
commitments. Any inconsistency will violate the SSNIZK language, and because the proof system with
honest setup is assumed to be sound, it is not feasible for anyone to prove a false statement. Similarly,
the copies of pk and c held by all the users and the commitments received in the first round are assumed
to be the same for all users, thanks to the one-time signatures. Finally, the two rounds of blinding and
unblinding serve to verify the consistency of pk with the pwi’s, and to compute the final output csk,
respectively. To be precise, the security of these rounds follows from our assumptions: cheating in the
computation of the blinding/unblinding rounds without getting caught is impossible since the CDH
are publicly verifiable. Finally note that the players are not granted the right to check that the group
leader uses the correct exponents when it publishes ζ ′n+1. This could only be a sensible issue when the
group leader is corrupted, but we will show that it cannot get any additional information.
Game G1: Simulation of the SSNIZK proofs. This game modifies how the zero-knowledge proofs
are performed. Specifically, instead of using the honest-prover strategy, all the proofs Π1j and Π
2
j in
which the prover is an honest user are simulated using the zero-knowledge simulator (also note that
the common reference string γ is also simulated once and for all). Since the proofs are concurrent
zero-knowledge, the environment cannot distinguish between the two games G1 and G0. That is, if
an environment could distinguish between these hybrids (ie become aware that the two commitments
possibly commit to/encrypt different passwords when the simulator claim the passwords are the same),
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one could construct an adversary that breaks the zero-knowledge property of the proof protocol. We
assume that he still knows the passwords of the players so that everything else is done correctly.
Game G2: Use of a linear basis (U1, U2, U3). In this game, the simulator is allowed to swap
the basis (U1, U2, U3) for a linear one used for Ci. This will allow him to simulate properly, and in
particular to be able to extract the password committed in the values Ci’s. The adversary cannot
become aware of this change thanks to the DLin assumption. The adversary still knows the passwords
of the players and computes everything honestly. Furthermore, the soundness of the SSNIZK proofs
still holds thanks to the indistiguishability of the 3-tuples (relying on the DLin assumption). Thus, this
game is indistinguishable from the previous one.
Game G3: Simulation of the first round of commitments. The passwords are still known to
the simulator, but he uses dummy passwords for the first round of commitments. He then uses the real
ones for the second rounds of commitments (C ′i and Ai). Thanks to the simulation-soundness of the
proofs, the adversary cannot become aware that the simulator is proving a wrong statement in (1b).
Furthermore, thanks to the witness indistinguishability of the first proof (since the basis is linear),
the environment cannot become aware that we are using dummy passwords in Ci. This game is thus
indistinguishable from the previous one.
Game G4: Use of a non-linear basis. Everything works as before except that the simulator comes
back with a non-linear basis in the first step. The simulator is then allowed to program (once and for
all) the totality of the common reference string. This is indistinguishable from the previous game due
to the DLin assumption.
Game G5: Simulation of the first round of commitments. From this game on, S simulates the
first rounds of commitments in the following way. We suppose that he still knows the passwords of the
players. Let nh be the number of honest users, i.e. the users S has to simulate. S chooses at random
nh dummy passwords p˜wi1 , . . . , p˜winh on behalf of each one of these users. Once all these values are
set, S computes the first-round commitments and send them to everybody.
S then learns from the functionality whether the users all share the same c and pk or not. In the
second case, S aborts the game. In the first case, S goes on the execution of the protocol in a honest
way, using the real passwords of the users. Note that he will have to prove false statements, which is not
a problem since the proofs are simulated since the former games. In the end, if the execution succeeds,
he asks a Computation query, and he finally sets the bit b to 1 in the Delivery query. Otherwise, if the
execution fails, he also asks a Computation query but sets the bit b to 0 for the delivery.
Since the first-round commitment is hiding, the adversary cannot become aware of the transforma-
tion of the p˜wi’s into pwi’s: this game is indistinguishable from G4.
Game G6: Simulation of honest users with compatible passwords. From this game on, we
show how to simulate the users without using their passwords. More precisely, the simulator is still
supposed to know the passwords of the users, but little by little we are going to show that he actually
never needs them in the simulation. This will ensure in the end that the simulator does not need the
knowledge of the passwords in order to perform the simulation honestly.
Note that from this game on, we can suppose that all the c and the pk are identical, since the case
of different values has been dealt with in the former game (and the simulator aborts the protocol in
this case). The first round of commitments is simulated as in G5. We now face two cases.
First, if there are attacked users among the group, the simulation continues as in the former game,
S being allowed to use the passwords of all the users. (We show in G8 and G9 how to simulate in this
case without using the passwords.)
Second, if all users are honest, we show how to continue the simulation without the help of the
passwords. Note that if at some point some flows are non-oracle-generated, the protocol will abort: In
this case, the simulator will set the bit b to 0 in the Delivery query. This comes from the non-malleability
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of the SSNIZK proofs. If the adversary has not generated the first commitments, he will not be able to
construct valid proofs, with unknown witnesses.
The simulator first asks a Computation query along with a Delivery query to the functionality, which
gives him either complete or error. In the second case, S continues the simulation as in the former game,
and we allow him to use the passwords of the users (we show in G7 how to get rid of the use of the
passwords).
We now consider the first case and sum up briefly the circumstances which led us here: The users
are honest, they have the same c and pk, and their passwords are compatible with the public key. Then,
S keeps on using the passwords p˜w2, . . . , p˜wn for the n−1 last users, and he is able to set gfpw′1 (without
knowing p˜w′1) such that all the passwords are compatible with the value gsk, using the equation:
gfpw′1gfpw2 . . . gfpwn = gsk = pk
But he still uses cfpw1 for the last commitment, since he does not know csk. Notice that he will give
once again a proof for a false statement. The simulator then continues honestly the game, by choosing
random values αi and βi and executing the four rings as described in the protocol. Note that S sends
a random value for ζ ′n+1 = cskβx on behalf of the (honest) group leader. This means that the simulator
does not know x, but such an x exists to be consistant with the actual (but unknown) values of β and
sk. The following is then perfectly indistinguishable since the blinding factor x will never be publicly
removed. Then, no information about x leaks. In the Delivery query, the bit b is chosen as described
in G5. Finally note that the simulator never needed the knowledge of the passwords of the users.
Due to the non-malleability of the commitments, along with their hiding property, this game is
indistinguishable from G5.
Remark. Note that for the distributed key generation protocol, things would have been simpler.
In this case, the simulator not only receives complete or error, but the exact value of pk = gsk. He is
thus able to modify p˜w1 such that the passwords are compatible with the public key. This is similar to
what the simulator will do in G8 for csk when the group leader is corrupted. Indeed, in this case, the
simulator will learn the exact value of csk from the functionality (as he does for gsk here).
Game G7: Simulation of honest users with incompatible passwords. This game starts
exactly as in G6. If there are attacked users, the simulator is granted the right to use the passwords of
all the users, and continues as in G5.
If all the users are honest, he continues as in G6, by asking a CompatiblePwd query. We showed
in G6 how to deal with the case where the functionality returns correct (that is, when the passwords
are compatible with the public key) without using the passwords of the users. We now consider the
other case and show how to treat it. Thus, we suppose that the CompatiblePwd query returns an error,
meaning that the passwords are incompatible with the public key.
The simulator then computes commitments of the values gfpwi and cfpwi for all the users (there is no
need that their passwords should be compatible). He sends them along with the corresponding proofs
to the other users. The simulator then continues honestly the game, by choosing random values αi and
βi and executing the two first rings as described in the protocol. Note that the real passwords of the
users are not needed anymore. Since the protocol will fail at the verification step, the simulator will
set the bit b to 0 in the Delivery query.
Since the commitments are hiding, this game is indistinguishable from G6.
Game G8: Simulation in case of compatible passwords in presence of an adversary. This
game starts exactly as in G5. The case where all the users are honest has been dealt with in the
games G6 and G7. We now consider the case in which the adversary controls a set of users. Recall
that we denote by nh the number of honest users.
Note that choosing g1, g2 and g3 allows S to know the discrete logarithm of g1 and g2 in base g3. Since
the commitments are linear ciphertexts, knowledge of these discrete logarithms will allow the simulator
to decrypt the ciphertexts and then extract the passwords used by A in the first-round commitments.
(The actual extraction requires taking discrete logarithms, but this can be done efficiently using generic
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methods, because the discrete logarithms to extract are bits. And the small size is enforced by a
WIProofBit.)
After this first round, the simulator thus extracts the passwords used by the adversary in the
commitments he sent. Note that the honest users are not supposed to have received the same values
from the adversary: We only know that these values are non-oracle-generated, but not necessarily
equal. Thus, the simulator chooses at random one of the commitments received from an attacked user
to extract and recover its password. One could argue that there is a problem here, but note that the
signature given with the second commitment will not be accepted if the value H is not the same for
all users (recall that we have assumed a collision-resistant hash function for the computation of H).
Once S has recovered all the passwords of the attacked users, he asks a CompatiblePwd query. If
this query returns incorrect, we continue the simulation as in G5 (we show in G9 how to deal with this
case without using the passwords of the users).
We now suppose that the query returns correct. This provides the following equation:
g
nhP
j=1
pwij
= pk
/
g
P
Pi attacked
pwi
Recall that the passwords of the honest users were chosen at random, so there is no chance that
they should be compatible with the (common) public key. S thus keeps its nh − 1 first passwords and
computes a replacement value gfpw′inh thanks to the above equation. Remark that he does not know
the corresponding password p˜w′inh .
In the second round, the simulator must produce commitments that are compatible with the public
key. To do so, he makes commitments on the same random passwords as before for the nh − 1 first
honest users, and for the last one creates a commitment as a linear encryption of gfpw′inh . He sends them
all out. In the same round, the simulator must also produce another series of password commitments,
this time as linear encryptions of cpwi and not gpwi .
We now have to consider two cases. First, suppose that the group leader is attacked. The simulator
computes the commitments normally for the first nh−1 honest players using the simulated passwords.
For the last player Pinh , he asks a Delivery query in order to recover c
sk, and computes the missing
commitment as a linear encryption of cfpw′′inh , which is given by
cfpw′′nh = csk
/
c
nh−1P
j=1
fpwij
c
P
Pi attacked
pwi
Otherwise, if the group leader is not attacked, the simulator will not recover csk. We thus proceed
as in G6, using incorrect values c
fpwij for the honest players, not compatible with csk.
S sends out the commitments along with the proofs of consistency. Note that in the second case
he will prove a false statement for the group leader.
The simulator then continues the game honestly, by choosing random values αi and βi and executing
the four rings as described in the protocol. Everything is simulated perfectly if the group leader is
attacked (with incorrect passwords, though, but compatible with csk). If the group leader tries to cheat
in the value ζ ′n+1, the unblinding ring will still use the values βi that it does not know, and S can
simulate this unblinding ring correctly. The simulation of the honest players is done independently of
the group leader (whether it plays honestly or not), so that it cannot learn anything more than the
simulator already knows, that is csk.
Otherwise, the last step fails, without any bad consequence on the protocol since the group leader
ends the ring (as in G6). The bit b of the Delivery query is chosen as described in G5: if something
goes wrong and the protocol halts, then b = 0, otherwise b = 1.
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Since the commitments are computationally hiding under the DLin assumption, the adversary
cannot become aware that the passwords are not the good ones, or that the password for the user Pinh
changed between the two rounds of commitments. This game is indistinguishable from G7.
Game G9: Simulation in case of incompatible passwords in presence of an adversary.
This game starts exactly as in G8. We now suppose that the CompatiblePwd query returns incorrect.
Since the verification step will fail, S can keep all the values p˜wi1 , . . . , p˜winh for the second round of
commitments (in base g as in base c). He then sends these commitments along with the corresponding
proofs.
He then continues honestly the protocol (without knowing the real passwords of the users) until
it fails, at the verification step. The simulator then asks a CompatiblePwd query, and a Delivery query
with bit b = 0. For the same reasons than in the former game, G9 is indistinguishable from G8.
Game G10: Indistinguishability with the ideal world.We have shown that S is able in any case
to simulate the whole protocol without using the passwords of the users. Thus, we can now suppose
that he does not know these passwords.
The only difference between G9 and G10 is that the CompatiblePwd query is replaced by a Private
Computation query to the functionality, and the Delivery by a Leader Computation Delivery query. If a
session aborts or terminates, S reports it to A. If a session terminates with a message m, then S makes
a Delivery call to the functionality, specifying a bit b = 1. If the protocol fails, he gives a bit b = 0.
We now show that this last game G10 is indistinguishable from the ideal-world experiment IWE.
More precisely, we have to show that the group leader receives a correct message in G10 if and only if
it receives a correct message in the ideal world.
First, if the users share compatible passwords, the same public key, the same ciphertext, and all
the flows are oracle-generated until the end of the game, then the group leader will obtain a correct
message, both in G10 (from G6) and the ideal world. More precisely, the protocol will end on a random
value in G6, but nobody will be able to distinguish it from the real value. And the leader will obtain
the correct value from the Delivery query. Second, if they share compatible passwords, the same public
key, the same ciphertext, and if the group leader is corrupted, then the group leader will also receive a
correct message (from G8). Third, if they do not share compatible passwords or if some received flows
differ from one user to an other, then the group leader will get an error (from G7 and G9 in the first
case, and due to the bit b otherwise).
This establishes that, given any adversary A that attacks the protocol Π in the real world, we can
build a simulator S that interacts with the functionality F in the ideal world, in such a way that the
environment cannot distinguish which world it is in.
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